Introduction
Call a theory of moral value finitely additive just in case it morally ranks worlds with finitely many locations of value on the basis of the sum of the values at each location. Utilitarianism is a paradigm finitely additive theory of value (with people as the locations of value, and welfare as the conception of 2 value). There has been much debate about how finitely additive moral theories should rank worlds when there are infinitely many locations of value. The problem is that when there are infinitely many locations of value, the sums may be infinite or may not exist at all and thus may provide no guidance for ranking worlds with infinitely many locations. Many authors, however, believe that not all worlds with infinite sums are equally valuable. Vallentyne and Kagan (1997) , for example, have argued that a world with an infinite number of people each having two units of value (e.g., happiness) is morally better than a world with the same people but each having only one unit of value. The sums in both cases, however, are infinite. 1 The core idea that Vallentyne and Kagan (and others) appeal to and defend is a Pareto principle:
Weak Pareto: If two worlds U and V have the same locations, and each location has more goodness in U than it does in V, then U is
1 In the 1920s, Frank Plumpton Ramsey discovered the problem of aggregating utilities over an infinite time horizon. This problem was further analyzed in growth theory and in social choice theory; see for instance, Koopmans (1960) , Atsumi (1965) , Von Weizsäcker (1965) , Lauwers (1998) , and Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) . In philosophy, the problem was independently discovered, and a solution proposed, by Segerberg (1976) .
More recently, the problem was rediscovered by Nelson (1991) , and a solution was proposed by Vallentyne (1993) .
3 better than V. 2 This principle gives the desired judgement in the above example (that everyone with 2 units is better than the same people with only 1 unit).
Vallentyne and Kagan develop and defend various strengthenings of Weak
Pareto.
In a recent contribution, Hamkins and Montero (2000) have argued that Weak Pareto is implausible in the infinite case (although quite plausible in the finite case), and defended alternative principles. We shall here defend Weak Pareto against their criticisms and argue against an isomorphism principle that they defend. Where locations are the same in both worlds, but have no natural order, our argument leads to an endorsement, and strengthening, of a principle defended by Vallentyne and Kagan, and to an endorsement of a weakened version of the catching-up criterion developed by Atsumi and by von Weizsäcker.
Throughout, it's important to keep in mind that our arguments are addressed to those who accept finite additivity of value (e.g., utilitarians).
They are not meant to defend finite additivity against those who reject it (e.g., egalitarians). The issue concerns how finite additivity should be extended when there are infinitely-many locations of value.
Background
Throughout we focus on the ranking of worlds on the basis of the relation of 4 being morally at least as good. We assume, as do Hamkins and Montero (and virtually everyone else) , that this ranking of worlds is transitive:
Transitivity: If a world U is at least as good as V, and V is at least as good as W, then U is at least as good as W.
As usual, a world is better than a second just in case it is at least as good but not vice versa, and a world is equally good as a second just in case it is at least as good and vice versa. We do not assume completeness (that, for any two worlds, one of them is at least as good as the other). When there are an infinite number of locations of value, completeness is difficult to achieve in a plausible explicitly stated ranking. 3 Although we shall be concerned with cases where the total value in a world is infinite, we limit our attention throughout (as do Hamkins and Montero) to cases where the value at each location is finite. We shall, that is, only be considering cases where infinite total value arises from the sum of infinitely many finite values. Moreover, we assume throughout that the number of locations is countably infinite. 3 Fleurbaey and Michel (2003, p. 794) conjecture that there does not exist an explicit discription of a complete rule that satisfies loose Pareto (see below, Section 3) and a weak infinite version of Suppes indifference (to wit, indifference to finite permutations). They conjecture that although such rules exist, proof of their existence involves some version of the axiom of choice (or the weaker ultrafilter axiom).
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We further assume, again in agreement with Hamkins and Montero, the following principle:
Sum: If, for each of two worlds, the sum of the values at their locations exists and is finite, then the first world is at least as good as the second world if and only if its sum is at least as great.
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This principle asserts that, even in the infinite case, worlds should be ranked on the basis of their summed goodness-if these sums exist and are finite. The whole problem with ranking infinite worlds (i.e., worlds with infinitely many locations of value) is that often the sums are infinite or do not exist. Where finite sums exist, there is no problem. The ranking should be done on the basis of the sums (as in the finite case). Thus, for example, if a world has an infinite number of people with value (e.g., happiness) levels (on some arbitrary ordering of the individuals) of 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, etc., and a second world has an infinite number of people with value levels of .9, 0,0,0, etc., then the first world is better than the second world. It's a mathematical fact that the first sum is one and the second is .9.
In the infinite case, Sum must be applied with caution. If locations of value have a natural order 5 -as points in time do-then it can be applied 4 In Fishkind, Hamkins, and Montero (2002) , Sum is considered a rock-bottom principle for additive theories.
5 See Vallentyne and Kagan (1997) for a discussion of the tricky notion of "natural" order. 
Isomorphism and Loose Pareto
Hamkins and Montero ask us to consider the assessment of soccer teams in the game of "infinite soccer". Each team has an infinite number of players, all of whom play at any given time (there are no extras). Furthermore, each player is assumed-solely for reasons of simplicity of illustration-to be equally good at all positions. (The fact that there are specialized positions on a soccer team is irrelevant to the point of the example.) Consider a team for which the talent levels of the players are as follows: Table 1 This table indicates that player a k has a talent level equal to k units (on some scale of measurement).
The coach of the team wants to improve his team. There is a trainer able to raise the talent level of each player by one unit. Should the coach engage this trainer? According to Weak Pareto, the answer appears to be yes.
Let A be Team A after the training. The results would be as follows: Loose Pareto is plausible, but so is, we shall argue, Weak Pareto.
Isomorphism, on the other hand, is not plausible, and we shall argue against it.
Against Isomorphism
The starting point of our argument is the conjunction of Sum and Loose Pareto, which are two basic principles for finitely additive theories. Below we introduce and defend a third principle that we label "Zero Independence".
Those who accept Sum, Loose Pareto, and this third principle, must reject Isomorphism.
In our discussion, we restrict Isomorphism to cases were the locations in the two worlds are the same. The crucial point about the above example is that for both B and B the sums of the values at the locations are finite and could thus be used to rank Table 5 In comparing B, B* and B**, Loose Pareto yields the judgement that B** is at least as good as B*, which is at least as good as B-just as it did in comparing B, B, and B. We cannot, however, here apply Sum to get the judgements that B* and B** are each better than B (as we did in the case of B, B, and B). This is because the sums are infinite for these three worlds.
Surely, however, we should be able to make the comparable judgements here as well. After all, the improvements made in moving from B to B* to B** are the same as the respective improvements made in moving from B to B to B.
In both cases, the first improvement was to improve one position's talent by one unit, and the second improvement was to improve the talent of all remaining positions by one unit. So, if B and B are better than B, then B* and B** are better than B.
The following principle captures the idea that the ranking of two 15 worlds is determined by the pattern of local differences. It appeals to the notion of world value "addition" understood as follows (where we also define world value "subtraction" for future reference). For two worlds, U and V, with the same locations, U+V (respectively, U-V) is a world with the same locations, with the value at each location equal to value at U at that location plus (respectively, minus) the value at V at that location. For example, if U has 4 at each location, and V has 3, then U+V has 7 at each location, and U-V has 1 at each location. Here, then, is the principle:
and W are worlds with the same locations, then U is at least as good as V if and only if the world U+W is at least as good as V+W.
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This principle has the effect of saying that the ranking of two worlds is determined by the pattern of differences in local value. To see this clearly, understand the zero world of a given world to be a world with the same locations but with zero units of value at each location. If we let W be -V (the complement of V, i.e., -k at each location at which V has value k), then Zero
Independence says that U is at least at good as V if and only if U-V is at least as good as its zero world. The ranking of U and V, that is, depends only on the pattern of differences in local value at the two worlds, and not on the particular values present at those locations. Zero Independence says, for example, that, above, the ranking of B* relative to B is the same as that of B*-B relative to its zero world. B*-B just is B and its zero world just is B. Hence, B* is better than B because B is, according to Sum, better than B.
Zero Independence on its own has no implications for how any two worlds are ranked. It is rather a consistency condition that requires that judgements by other principles be made in a certain way. 10 The important point to note is that it allows judgements about a world ranking relative to its zero world to be applied to judgements about the ranking of two other worlds having the same locations and the same relative differences of local value. It thus allows the power of Sum to be exported to cases in which finite sums do not exist. In the above example, it permits B* to be judged better than B even though neither world has a finite sum. Isomorphism is not, we claim, as plausible as Zero Independence. In the finite case, Isomorphism is indeed plausible, but in the finite case it is not possible for there to be (1) a structure-respecting correspondence between the locations of two worlds such that the value at each location in one world is the same as the value at its counterpart location in the second world (i.e., an isomorphism), and also (2) a structure-respecting correspondence between the locations of two worlds such that the value at each location in one world is greater than the value at its counterpart location in the second world. In the infinite case, however, both kinds of correspondences may hold between two worlds (e.g., between the infinite soccer team before and after training only if G+L  0.
2. If G is infinity and L is a finite number, then U is better than V.
3. If G is a finite number and L is minus infinity, then V is better than U.
4. If both G and L are infinite, then no judgement is made.
This principle can usefully be broken into the following two principles, where infinity is understood to be greater than any finite number and negative infinity understood to be less than any finite number: We believe that these principles are plausible. The desirability of moving from world U to world V is determined by whether the gains exceed the losses. If the total gains G and the total losses L are finite, we follow the classical sum rule and judge V as better (respectively: equally good, worse,)
than U just in case the gains exceed (respectively: equal, are less than) the losses. If the total gains (respectively: losses) are infinitely large and the total 24 losses (respectively: gains) are finite, then again, it seems plausible to conclude V is better (respectively: worse) than U. Table 7 Sum is silent about the ranking of X and X, for each sum is infinite.
Differential Indifference, however, judges them equally good. It does this because X-X is simply X , and X is equally as valuable as its zero world (because for X the sum of its negative values is -1 and the sum of its positive values is 1). This is an example of the power of Zero Independence implicit in Differential Indifference.
In the appendix, we prove the following:
Theorem 2: The conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero
Independence entails the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential Indifference, but not vice-versa. Nonetheless, they generate the same ranking rule.
To intuitively explain the content of this theorem, we need to explain two things. One is why the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential Indifferences is strictly weaker than the conjunction of our four principles. The other is to explain how two non-equivalent sets of conditions can nonetheless generate the same ranking rule.
The conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential
Indifference is strictly weaker than the conjunction of our four principles. This is to say that each binary relation that satisfies Transitivity, Sum, Loose
Pareto, and Zero Independence also satisfies Differential Betterness and
Differential Indifference, but not vice versa. The vice-versa claim does not hold because the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential
Indifference has no implications for the ranking of case 4 (above) pairs (i.e., where the sum of the non-negative differences in value is infinite and the sum of the negative differences in values is infinitely negative), whereas the conjunction of our four principles do have some (conditional) implications for such cases. . Let x and y, y and z, and z and x, each be a case 4 pair. The conjunction of the two differential principles is silent about each of these rankings, and is thus compatible with the supposition that x is better than y, y better than z, but z is better than x (a violation of transitivity). Our four principles-which include Transitivity-however, are incompatible with this supposition. Thus, the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential
Indifference does not entail the conjunction of our four principles.
Although the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential
Indifference is strictly weaker than the conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, to the finite number of locations selected, the first world is k-better (i.e., has a total that, on some specified scale, is at least k units higher, for some fixed real number k) than the second, then the first world is better than the second (considering all locations). (The notion of k-betterness is introduced to handle complications that arise when sums of infinitely many values have a finite value.)
Consider, for example, an earlier example: Table 8 SBI1 agrees with Differential Betterness in judging B as better than B, and B as better than B. B is judged better than B because, for any set of at least two locations (positions), the total goodness in B in the selected locations is at least one unit greater than that in B. B is judged better than B because, for any set that includes at least location b 0 , the total goodness in B in the selected locations is at least one unit greater than that in B.
SBI1, it turns out, is equivalent to Differential Betterness. In the appendix, we prove:
Theorem 3: A ranking rule, for worlds with the same locations, satisfies SBI1 if and only if it satisfies Differential Betterness.
Thus, Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero Independence entail Differential Indifference and Differential Betterness, the latter of which is equivalent to SBI1. Given that Differential Betterness is more intuitive and easier to understand than SBI1, all future discussion should, we suggest, focus on Differential Betterness. The complex and arcane language of SBI1 no longer needs to be considered.
Comparisons with the Catching-Up Criterion
In the economics literature, one of the best known finitely additive criteria for ranking worlds when there an infinite number of locations comes from the work of Atsumi (1965) and von Weizsäcker (1965) :
Catching-Up: One world, U, is at least as good as a second world (having the same locations), V, if and only if the lower limit, as T approaches infinity, of the sum of the values of U-V at locations 1 to T is at least as great as zero (that is, if and only if
This condition holds that (as with Zero Independence) the ranking of two worlds can be determined by considering the world that results from subtracting, at each location, the values of one world from those of the other and comparing this world with the value of its zero world. Roughly, the idea is that if, when enough locations are considered, the sum of these differences is at least as great as zero, and this remains so no matter how many additional locations are added in, then the first world is at least as good as the second world.
There are three ways in which Catching-Up may be too strong. If, however, the locations are listed in a different order, the opposite result can be obtained. For example, if locations have no natural structure, then the first world can also be specified by <-1,-1,1,-1,-1,1,-1,-1,1,…>, and, relative to this enumeration, Catching-Up says that the zero world is better. Hence, the mere existence of a particular enumeration that ensures that the original criterion is satisfied is not sufficient for being at least as good.
The other main way of responding to the absence of a natural order is to reformulate Catching-Up so that it applies only where the original condition is satisfied by all possible enumerations of locations. In what follows, we shall 31 invoke this weakening of the original criterion.
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A third way that Catching-Up may need to be weakened concerns the issue of whether the locations in the two worlds are the same. Atsumi and von
Weizsäcker implicitly assume that they are (and this is plausible for the case of future times starting from a common point), but in general this need not be so. Ranking infinite worlds with different locations is a tricky business, and we cannot here discuss the many relevant issues. 16 We shall therefore simply weaken Catching-Up so as to be conditional on the locations being the same in both worlds.
Taking into account the above three weakenings of Catching-Up leads to the following:
Weak Catching-Up: If (1) U and V have the same locations, and (2) for all possible enumerations of locations, the lower limit, as T approaches infinity, of the sum of the values of U-V at locations 1 to T is at least as great as zero (i.e., lim T→∞ inf ∑ t=1,..,T (U t -V t )  0), then U is at least as good as V.
In the appendix we prove: 15 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting that we pursue the connection between our conditions and the Weizsäcker condition weakened in the way just identified.
Theorem 4:
The conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and
Zero Independence entails Weak Catching-Up, but not vice-versa.
Nonetheless, they generate the same ranking rule.
Given Theorem 2, it immediately follows that the ranking rule generated by the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential
Indifference is the same as that generated by Weak Catching-Up. Indeed, in the appendix, we prove the following slightly stronger result:
Theorem 5: A ranking rule, for worlds with the same locations,
satisfies Weak Catching-Up if and only if it satisfies Differential
Betterness and Differential Indifference.
Necessary Conditions for Being At Least as Good
The conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero Independence implies each of the following (equivalent) sufficient conditions for being at least as good: Weak Catching-Up, the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential Indifference, and the conjunction of SBI1 and Differential
Indifference. Each of these is silent about the ranking of worlds that do not satisfy the imposed condition. More specifically, as discussed in Section 5, each is silent about the ranking of a world U and a world V if and only if (1) the sum of the non-negative values of U-V is infinite, and (2) the sum of the negative values of U-V is infinitely negative. Call two worlds that satisfy these two conditions a double infinity pair. Worlds <….1,1,1,1,1,…> and <…2,0,2,0,2,0,2,…> are, for example, a double infinity pair.
The above conditions are silent for double infinity pairs. This means that they are compatible with the two worlds being incomparable, but also compatible with one of them being at least as good as the other. We believe, however, that, if locations have no natural structure, then double infinity pairs should be judged incomparable. Hence, we believe, if locations have no natural structure, then the above conditions should be strengthened to necessary and sufficient conditions.
We shall not, however, attempt to defend this view here. Instead, we shall simply show that it follows from the above conditions if one final seeming plausible condition is added. The condition appeals to the notion of a restricted transfer, which is (1) a transfer of a positive amount of value from a location with positive value to a location with negative value such that (2) after the transfer, the donor location still has non-negative value and the recipient location still has non-positive value. For example, the move from <-1,3> to <0,2> is a restricted transfer, but the move from <-1,3> to <1,1> is not.
Consider then:
Restricted Transfers: If locations have no natural structure, then, for any three worlds, U, U*, and V, having the same locations, if (1) U is better than V, and (2) U* is obtainable from U by some (possibly infinite) number of restricted transfers, then U* is better than V.
This condition is, we believe, plausible. Note first that the conjunction to T is at least as great as zero (i.e., lim T→∞ inf ∑ t=1,..,T 
This is exactly like Weak Catching-Up, except that (1) it asserts that satisfaction of the limit condition for all possible enumerations is necessary and sufficient (and not merely sufficient) for being at least as good, and (2) it is conditional on locations not having any natural structure. The second qualification is necessary, since where locations have a natural structure it is not necessary that the limit condition hold for all possible enumerations. It only needs to hold for certain kinds of (e.g., isometric) structure-preserving enumerations.
We can now characterize the Full Weak Catching-Up (proof in appendix): Finally, we suggested that, where locations have no natural order, the above principles exhaust the plausible judgements. The conditions that they hold are sufficient for one world being at least as good as another are also necessary. We did not defend this suggestion, but we did show that it follows if one further accepts the Restricted Transfers principle that we formulated.
Defense of this principle must await another occasion.
The hypothesis implies that L is finite and G is (finitely or infinitely) greater than -L0.
If G is finite, then G+L>0 and S implies that U-V is better than its zero world. Apply ZI and conclude that U is better than V. If G is infinite, let G* be like U-V except with 0 wherever U-V has a negative value, and let L* be like U-V except that it has 0 wherever U-V has positive value and has the absolute (hence positive) value where the values are negative. This ensures that U-V = G*-L*, and thus that U and V will be ranked as G* and L* are Consequently, U is better than V.
A.2. The conjunction of T, S, LP, and ZI entails DI.
Suppose that U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of DI. It follows that G and L are finite and G+L=0. According to S, we have that U-V is equally good as its zero world. Apply ZI and conclude that U is equally as good as V.
B.
Here we prove that the domain of the rule generated by T, S, LP, and ZI coincides with the domain of the conjunction of DB and DI. From Part A it follows that the domain of the rule generated by T, S, LP, and ZI includes the domain of the conjunction of DB and DI. From their definitions it is clear that DB and DI are silent on a pair if and only if it is a double infinity pair (i.e., a pair, U and V, for which the sum of the non-negative values (G) and the sum of the negative values (L) are each infinite). Hence, it is sufficient to show that the rule generated by T, S, LP, and ZI is also silent on double infinity pairs.
We define a collection of rules that satisfy T, S, LP, ZI, and completeness. The definition is as follows: since we consider infinite worlds with the same countably many locations, the locations can be indexed by the set N = {0,1,2,…,n,…} of natural numbers (of course, this numbering is not unique). Next, let F be a free ultrafilter on the set of natural numbers, i.e. F is a collection of subsets of N that satisfy: 
F.
The existence of a free ultrafilter follows from the axiom of choice (Zorn's lemma). Each free ultrafilter defines a limit operator. 17 Let a = (a 0 ,a 1 ,…,a n ,…) be a sequence of numbers, then lim We define the following ranking rule:
Let U and V be two worlds with the same (countable infinite set of) locations. Then U is at least as good as V if and only if lim
This rule satisfies reflexivity, T 18 , S 19 , LP, and ZI (and hence, by Part A, 18 Let F be a free ultrafilter and suppose that according to lim F world U is at least as good as V and V is at least as good as W.
Let B collect the locations n for which  k=0,…,n (V k -W k )  0. Then A and B both belong to F. Therefore, the intersection C = A  B also belongs to F. As a consequence, for each n in C, we have  k=0,…,n (U k -W k )  0. As C belongs to first, we number the set of locations, and secondly, we select an ultrafilter.
B1. Now consider a double infinity pair U and V (i.e. both G and L are infinite). In this case there are infinitely many locations at which U-V is positive and infinitely many locations at which U-V is negative. Select a finite set S of locations such that  S (U k -V k ) > 1 (this is possible because G is infinite). In numbering the locations, we start with this set S. Expanding S, we number the locations in such a way that at infinitely many locations the partial sum becomes greater than 1. Let F be a free ultrafilter that contains the set of these locations (where the partial sum is greater than 1). Then, according to the rule lim F , world U is better than V. If we repeat this construction with U and V interchanged, then we end up with a rule (that satisfies T, S, LP, and ZI) that considers V better than U (i.e., the opposite ranking). Hence, the conjunction of T, S, LP, and ZI is silent when G and L are each infinite.
Conclusion:
The rule generated by S, LP, and ZI is silent if and only if G and L are both infinite, which is precisely when the conjunction of DB and converges to the same limit. Note also that if the series (U k -V k ) converges absolutely then the value of lim F (U k -V k ) does not depend upon how the locations are numbered and upon which free ultrafilter is considered.
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DI is silent. A. DB entails SBI1.
Suppose that the antecedent condition of SBI1 (concerning finite expansions) is satisfied. By definition, L is negative, and there are two cases to consider:
(1) Suppose first that L is finite. In this case, it is sufficient to show that G+L is positive (since DB will then judge U as better than V, as required).
We do this by deriving a contradiction from the supposition that G is less than or equal to the absolute value of L. If so, then G and L are both finite and the sum of the values in U-V absolutely converges to G+L, which is less than or equal to zero. If so, then for each positive k there exists a finite expansion such that (i) the restriction of U-V to this expansion adds up to a number less than k and (ii) all further expansions generate a total less than k.
This is in conflict with the assumption that the antecedent conditions of SBI1 are satisfied. Hence, G+L is positive, and thus DB judges that U is better than V, as required by SBI1.
(2) Suppose next that L converges to minus infinity. If so, then there are infinitely many locations with a negative utility. Take any finite set S of 45 locations such that the restriction of U-V to this set adds up to a positive number (given that antecedent conditions of SBI1 hold, such a set S must exist). Then add enough locations with a negative amount of utility and this superset will end up with a negative total. This, however, contradicts the assumption that the antecedent conditions of SBI1 hold. Hence, this case is impossible.
Conclusion: Only the first case is possible and in it DB ensures that U is judged better than V. Hence, the consequent clause of SBI1 holds.
B. SBI1 entails DB.
Suppose that the antecedent of DB is true, that is, G+L is (finitely or infinitely) positive, say G+L>>0. For this to be so, L must be finite, and G is either finite (and greater than -L) or infinite. In either case, let k=/2>0.
Then, no matter what finite set of locations one starts with, one can finitely expand it so that, relative to any further finite expansion, the sum of the values in U in this set is k-greater than the sum of the values in V in this set.
Hence SBI1 ensures that U is better than V, as required by DB. Hence, it is sufficient to show that WW is silent for double infinity pairs. Now, if U and V is a double infinity pair, then one can define a lim F principle (cf. Part B1 in the proof of Theorem 2) such that lim F ∑ (U t -V t ) < 0. Therefore, with respect to the corresponding enumeration, one has that lim inf ∑ (U t -V t ) ≤ lim F ∑ (U t -V t ) < 0. Repeat this construction with U and V interchanged, and obtain another enumeration for which lim inf ∑ (V t -U t ) < 0. Conclude that WW is silent for double infinity pairs and that WW coincides with the rule generated by T, S, LP, and ZI. (ii) Consider a double infinity pair U and V, that is, for which G and L are both infinite. According to FWW such a pair is incomparable. We show that the conjunction of T, S, LP, ZI, and RT entails incomparability. This is done by contradiction: assume U is not worse than V. Fix a location l for which n = U l -V l is negative. By RT, the local differences at all other locations can (with an infinite number of restricted transfers) be brought to zero without affecting the ranking of U and V. Hence, after these transfers, the local gains add up to 0 and the local losses to n. By S and ZI, world V should be better than U. This contradicts the initial assumption.
Conclusion: the conjunction of T, S, LP, ZI, and RT entails that double infinity pairs are incomparable and elsewhere it coincides with FWW. 
